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Ensuring a Diverse Bench: Is Florida
Up to the Task?
DEBORAH HARDIN WAGNER*
When Judge Barr and Judge Jones asked me to speak at this sympo-
sium, my first (though private) reaction was, "Why in the world would I
want to offer myself up as a punching bag for our distinguished panel in
a 3-hour debate on this sometimes cantankerous, always highly emo-
tional and controversial topic?" But, of course, I knew I had no choice.
As the cover on the reports of the Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Com-
mission emphasize, judges control the place where the injured fly for
justice. How those judges reached the bench, what those judges look
like, and what they do once they don their robes are all questions that
strike at the very heart of that justice.
We are asking today whether Florida's present system is still the
best compromise. Just looking at the present system makes me feel
overwhelmed, if not downright nauseous.
On the one hand, we currently have a merit selection and retention
system for appellate judges that is every bit as political as our elections,
where who you know often counts for more than what you know, where
nominating decisions are made in a secret star chamber, and where
retention is determined by either a rubber-stamp vote of an uninformed,
uninterested electorate or a special-interest dog-fight which can be more
costly than the most competitive elections.
On the other hand, we have an election system for trial judges that
wastes enormous amounts of money and incumbent judges' time and
produces the spectacles of: 1) judges deciding cases involving their
major campaign contributors; 2) unethical candidates slinging irrelevant
mud, while ethical judges are handicapped by restrictive rules of judicial
conduct; and 3) that same uninformed electorate deciding its vote based
on something as frivolous as where the candidate's name falls on the
ballot.
Though it may sound simplistic, here is the framework I use to
begin sorting out whether, and how, we must change the current system.
I ask three simple questions. First, what are our collective goals for
the system? Second, are those goals currently being met? Importantly,
here, we must separate fact from fiction and, however comforting our
* Member of the Florida Commission on Human Relations and former Executive Director
of the Florida Supreme Court's Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission.
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myths may be, exchange those myths for reality. Third, how can those
goals be better achieved? As I will explain, I am convinced that satisfy-
ing this last step will require Florida to exhibit vastly greater courage
and creativity than it has shown in the past.
With this framework in mind, I offer the following suggestions.
First, what are the goals of the system?
For years, both in scholarly and legal literature and in the public
discourse on the topic, two primary goals have been heralded: indepen-
dence and accountability. Undoubtedly, these are fine goals, and there
may be others, such as ensuring excellence. But Florida should go no
further in this debate without agreeing that diversity of the bench is a
goal worthy of equal, if not greater, commitment than all of the others
combined.
If you are wondering who could disagree with that goal, then you
have missed my point. We cannot merely agree not to disagree or con-
tinue simply to talk the good talk. We must commit ourselves to doing
what must be done to make Florida's bench representative of Florida's
people.
Why is that important? Reasons, such as fairness, are familiar, so I
will emphasize just one: legitimacy. In this fragile government of the
people we call "democracy," the power of judges to decide disputes
ultimately flows from the consent of the governed. The Racial and Eth-
nic Bias Study Commission felt very strongly that "the State simply can-
not expect continued acceptance of a judicial system in which minorities
are virtually invisible in positions of decision-making and
responsibility."1
Professor Donald Jones of the University of Miami School of Law
expressed this point this way:
There is a phrase by a writer named Richard Wright... about invisi-
bility. [H]e said there was a black man accused of being irresponsi-
ble. And the [system] was saying, "Well, how can you be so
irresponsible?" And the guy says, "You're damn right I'm irrespon-
sible, I'm invisible." I think that invisibility, the lack of being visible
in the system [as judges] . . ., has a lot to do with why a lot of people
feel that they have nothing to be responsible for.2
Second, are our goals being met?
Whatever one may say about the success of the other goals, the
goal of diversity is not being met by either system, appointive or
elective.
I. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE FLORIDA SuPREM COURT RACIAL AND ETHNic
BIAS STuDY COMMISSION, at 11 (1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMissION].
2. Id. (quoting Dr. Donald Jones's testimony before the Commission at a public hearing).
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The reality is that, while we are certainly making some progress in
diversifying Florida's bench, that progress is coming slowly, especially
in the courts of lower jurisdiction.
In 1990, when the Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Commission pub-
lished its first report, we documented that only 5.5% of Florida judges
were African-American or Hispanic.3 Today, that statewide percentage
has increased to 7. 1%
I will share more good news before the bad. In 1990, the Commis-
sion reported the striking news that only two minority judges sat on all
of the District Courts of Appeal [DCAs] combined, with four out of five
DCAs having no minority members at all.5 Since then, we have started
to move in the right direction. The number of minority judges has
grown to six, and at least one African-American or Hispanic judge now
sits on each DCA.6
This brings us to Myth #1. Some judges and others point to these
statistics as support for the argument that the appointment process, as
currently structured, is fair to minorities. Apparently, this myth is wide-
spread. In the 1991 survey of judges conducted for the Bench/Bar Com-
mission, 59% of judges thought that the merit selection process provides
an equal opportunity for minority candidates. 7
Here is the reality. While it is true that 85% of minority judges
currently on the county or circuit bench in Florida reached the bench by
way of mid-term gubernatorial appointment, the level of representation
of minorities is still far from acceptable and nowhere near what we can
justifiably call "fair." The fact that the appointive system probably has
produced more minority judges than the elective system says more about
the unfairness of the elective system than the fairness of the appointive
system.
As most of you know, Florida recently took a very significant step
toward reforming the appointive system. Following the Racial and Eth-
nic Bias Study Commission's recommendation that the membership of
all judicial nominating commissions [JNCs] be diversified, Governor
Chiles made an unprecedented number of minority appointments to
serve on those JNCs, and the Legislature later passed a bill requiring
such minority JNC appointments. This particular reform was absolutely
essential and, I am confident, accounts for a good bit of our progress on
this front.
3. Id. at 13.
4. Telephone Interview with Jane Flynn, Personnel Management Analyst, Office of State
Courts Administrator (Jan. 26, 1995).
5. STuDy COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 13.
6. Telephone Interview with Jane Flynn, supra note 4.
7. THE FLORIDA BAR, BENCH/BAR COMMISSION JUDICIAL ELECTION SURVEY, at 15 (1991).
1994]
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Nonetheless, I sincerely believe that this reform alone will be inad-
equate. If we begin appointing trial judges through the JNC process
without enacting further reforms, then minorities will still occupy a
minority voting position on many if not most JNCs. Beyond that, such a
move would effectively "grandfather in" the nearly all-white bench
which has resulted, in some measure, from the unfair elective and
appointive processes that have been in place over the last fifteen years.
Moreover, in the end, the quality of appointments depends on the iden-
tity and goodwill of the governor.
What about the current election system? Myths abound here as
well. In the same 1991 survey conducted for the Bench/Bar Commis-
sion, of those judges who had an opinion on the subject, over half
thought that at-large elections are fair to minority candidates.' Interest-
ingly, in a survey conducted for the Racial and Ethnic Bias Study Com-
mission one year earlier, a clear majority of African-American judges
thought that at-large elections favor non-minority candidates.' Reality
confirms the opinions of these African-American judges. Right now in
Florida, minorities represent only 4.8% of all judges on the circuit
courts. 10
In the last ten years, voting rights lawsuits challenging the fairness
of at-large judicial elections for state judges have been filed in twelve
states.11 Here in Florida, a 1992 case has held that the at-large election
system for the Second Judicial Circuit and Leon County violated the
Voting Rights Act,12 and a panel of the Eleventh Circuit has ruled that
at-large elections in Florida's Fourth Circuit and Duval County also
unlawfully dilute the vote of minority citizens. 3
What possible solutions achieve greater diversity?
Deciding whether to retain elections or adopt merit selection and
retention for trial judges clearly requires this type of analysis for all
stated goals, not just diversity. Because that broad analysis remains to
be done, I do not yet advocate any particular system. What I do suggest,
though, are specific reforms to achieve diversity whether we keep elec-
tions or move to merit selection for trial judges.
Before I offer my suggestions, let me dispel Myth #2: that the State
has the option of switching to a merit selection and retention system
8. Id.
9. STUDY CormissioN, supra note 1, at 20-21.
10. Telephone Interview with Jane Flynn, supra note 4.
11. Brenda Wright, The Bench and the Ballot: Applying the Protections of the Voting Rights
Act to Judicial Elections, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. Rav. 669, 670 n.9 (1991).
12. Davis v. Chiles, No. 90-40098 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 1992).
13. Nipper v. Smith, I F.3d 1171, vacated, 39 F.3d 1494 (11th Cir. 1994).
[Vol. 49:147
ENSURING A DIVERSE BENCH
without first making further reforms toward ensuring fairness for
minorities.
Some perceive that the pending voting rights litigation-with its
prospect of a mandated move to subdistrict elections-is fueling the
drive to abandon the election process in favor of an appointive system. I
personally believe this perception is grounded more in reality than in
myth.
Regardless of what I believe, however, the point is that a federal
judge may very well be persuaded that a change to an appointive system
for trial judges is being recommended primarily as a way to avoid com-
pliance with the Voting Rights Act. Indeed, that very objection may
come from the United States Attorney General, from whom five Florida
counties must obtain "preclearance" under the Voting Rights Act for any
change to their judicial election systems.
What does this mean? Simply, it means that Florida may not now
switch over to a purely appointive system for its trial judges without, as
part of that switch, instituting bold and creative reforms designed specif-
ically to increase the diversity of the bench.
What are those bold reforms?'4 If Florida retains the election sys-
tem to satisfy the overall goals the State has laid out, subdistricts should
be created in those jurisdictions in which racial majority bloc voting
usually defeats the candidate of most racial minority voters and in which
minority voters are geographically compact and politically cohesive.
This suggested reform brings to us Myth #3: that voting rights
plaintiffs or proponents are advocating a statewide conversion to a frag-
mented system of single-member districts. In reality, no one is advocat-
ing an automatic switch to single-member districts without first
examining the needs and voting patterns of each jurisdiction. What is
often discussed, though, is creating one or more subdistricts in those
jurisdictions in which voting is polarized along racial lines, and then
electing one or more judges from that subdistrict.
That any use of subdistricts would severely threaten judicial inde-
pendence and integrity is Myth #4. This myth involves two related
notions: 1) that judges elected from subdistricts would be open to
greater political pressure from a smaller constituency; and 2) that judges
elected from subdistricts would favor residents of their subdistrict over
litigants residing outside the subdistrict.
First, we should remember that subdistricts have already been
implemented, voluntarily or by the federal courts, in Mississippi, Louisi-
14. Because these reforms go beyond the work of the Commission, I am not now writing on
the Commission's behalf.
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ana, Texas, North Carolina, and Illinois, and we should draw upon their
experiences.15 As to the particular concern that subdistrict judges would
face increased political pressure, subdistricts proposed as remedies for
voting rights violations are often larger than some of the current at-large
districts. This is certainly likely to be the case in Florida as well.
The concern that subdistrict judges would brew up their own
"hometown cooking" or dispense "hometown justice" by favoring liti-
gants who live in their subdistrict is unfounded. First, that danger lurks
within the present system. State judges are frequently called upon to
hear cases involving one party from the local judicial district and
another from outside the district. In fact, this happens every time a resi-
dent of one district sues a resident of another. Judges are presumed to
be capable of acting impartially in these situations. In fact, judges most
often do not even know the particular residency of litigants appearing
before them.
Most importantly, no evidence exists to suggest that judges elected
from subdistricts are any less honest or impartial than judges elected at-
large. Judges elected from subdistricts in other states, including Missis-
sippi, have testified that they feel no increased pressure as a result of
subdistricting and that the use of subdistricts has improved, not dimin-
ished, the overall perception of fairness on the bench. 6 Even if these
concerns prove supportable by evidence, not merely by myth, they can
be solved by assigning a subdistrict judge to only those cases arising
from outside that subdistrict or by assigning another judge to hear cases
involving both a member and a non-member of the subdistrict at issue.
If Florida chooses, for reasons independent of the voting rights liti-
gation, to convert to an appointive process for trial judges, I offer this
final reform for consideration. Where fairness and historical voting pat-
terns dictate, the State could create the type of subdistricts I have
described above. Instead of electing judges from those subdistricts,
though, the State could establish a JNC for each of those subdistricts,
with some or all of the JNC's members elected from that subdistrict.
The JNC would then screen and ultimately recommend to the Governor,
just as JNCS do now, the names of three judicial candidates from that
subdistrict. A representative number of candidates could then be
appointed from that subdistrict.
What would this accomplish? Through subdistricting, minority
15. Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney Gen., 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991); Clark v. Roemer, 777
F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991); Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988); 1987 N.C.
Sess. Laws 509; Ill. Laws 86-786.
16. Wright, supra note 11, at 687 (citing Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471, 477 (M.D. La.
1991)).
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voters would have a greater opportunity to elect a JNC with minorities
occupying the majority voting position. In this way, minorities would
have a fair share of the power to decide who our judges will be. At the
same time, the reform would avoid the parade of horribles this Sympo-
sium has demonstrated exists in judicial elections, and, in the process,
just maybe we can get the best of both worlds.
Committing to a diverse judiciary...
Separating myths from reality...
Implementing bold, even innovative solutions...
Is Florida up to the task?
